


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12 May 1965



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
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State Dept. review completed



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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

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7. Notes:  
Sudan;

Dahomey;



## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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\*Dominican Republic: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT) There has still been no progress toward a political solution as the rebel Caamano government continues to hold the psychological initiative.

The military situation in Santo Domingo remains static with occasional sniper fire being directed against US forces. Most of the cease-fire violations yesterday were in the area north of the US-controlled corridor as the rebels strengthened further their strongholds in this part of the city.

The rebels continued yesterday their effective propaganda use of Radio Santo Domingo, which was still being heard well in the interior. They are exploiting their claims to represent the forces of constitutionality and popular revolt against the old establishment.

The Government of National Reconstruction (GNR), under the leadership of Antonio Imbert, made further slow progress in getting itself organized. It is still seriously hampered, however, by its inability to obtain the services of effective second-echelon administrators. Ambassador Bennett comments that a large number of qualified people are still unwilling to commit themselves and that the personal and family loyalties of many are split between the two contending governments. There is still much public uncertainty as to which government will ultimately come out on top.


Nevertheless, the GNR appears to control the interior and there have been no rebel successes reported there. US officials in one provincial capital comment, however, that while conditions are presently calm, unemployment is high and the longer the

situation remains unstabilized in the capital the  
greater the possibilities of local disturbances.

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\*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

Air Strikes: US and Vietnamese aircraft maintained the steady pace of the air war in North Vietnam with a large number of day and night armed reconnaissance missions on 11 May. No aircraft were lost.

A number of buildings, trucks, and railcars were either destroyed or damaged and at least six secondary bridges were damaged. A 200-foot tanker was attacked and damaged in the river southeast of Vinh. Pilots reported seeing a secondary explosion. In addition, a large unidentified boat was sunk in the river near Quang Khe.

Communist Military Activity: Preliminary analysis of 9 May photography revealed four MIG-15s at Haiphong/Cat Bi airfield. This is the first time that fighters have been confirmed at an airfield other than Phuc Yen. Cat Bi is one of five airfields in North Vietnam where revetments for jet aircraft have recently been detected under construction.

The same 9 May mission also photographed 48 MIG fighters at Phuc Yen airfield, including three being assembled. North Vietnam now has at least 52 MIG 15/17s of which eight probably came from the Soviet Union by rail through China within the last few weeks.]

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
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# NORTH VIETNAM



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The Situation in South Vietnam: South Vietnamese government reinforcements early on 11 May reoccupied Song Be, the capital of Phuoc Long Province to the north of Saigon, after it had been held by a Viet Cong force of three battalions for some seven hours. Heavy US air strikes preceded the landing of the government reaction force. A major battle has been reported developing to the northeast of the town, where the Viet Cong troops withdrew to fortified positions.

[Premier Quat told Ambassador Taylor yesterday that he had resolved his earlier dilemma over military command changes. He said that General Thieu had agreed to remain as defense minister, but with new responsibilities transferred from General "Little" Minh, whose title of commander-in-chief would be abolished and who would become chief of the General Staff. Although optimistic that the government could now move forward with other cabinet changes, Quat indicated some fear that General "Big" Minh's apparent determination to return from "exile" in Bangkok may stimulate new intrigue in the military.]

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The second Chinese article in two days about the possibility of negotiations with the imperialists appeared in Peiping's Red Flag of 10 May. The article-- by Senior General Lo Jui-ching, Vice Minister of National Defense--appears mainly to answer charges put forward by the Soviets in talks with DRV leaders that the Chinese are intransigent war maniacs, willing-- if not eager--to carry on the fight to the last Vietnamese. Lo admits that under some circumstances negotiations with imperialist countries are "necessary for the interests of the people and the revolution." He said that the Chinese have not refused to sign such agreements in the past and claimed that Peiping has always honored all the treaties it has signed. The main emphasis in his article, however, falls on the dangers involved in dealing with "perfidious" imperialist powers and the need for extreme caution and firm resolution in such circumstances.

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
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
EEC-France: [De Gaulle is apparently about to create a new atmosphere of crisis in the Common Market.]



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[Although it is unclear how far De Gaulle is prepared to go at this time to block community progress, there is evidence of a growing French restiveness over the degree to which the EEC is beginning to interfere with the independence of national decision making. De Gaulle's tactic may be to provoke a crisis in order to gain acceptance for an interim financing plan for the EEC's agricultural program--in which France is basically interested--without having to concede the "political" aspects of the commission's proposals.]

[Most of the other five probably have not yet decided how hard to fight the French on an issue in which they also have substantial interests. The Dutch have said they will refuse to accept any financing arrangement unless the European Parliament is strengthened, and there have recently been signs of a tougher German attitude. The meeting of the Council of Ministers on 13-14 May could thus begin another round of intense political activity crucial to the Common Market's future.]




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## INDIA AND PAKISTAN



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India-Pakistan: The situation in the Rann of Kutch has eased substantially, but heavy troop concentrations remain along other borders.

\*Press reports from Karachi yesterday that India and Pakistan had agreed to Prime Minister Wilson's latest proposals for formalizing the cease-fire in the Rann have not been confirmed from official sources. The intensive British effort to come up with a formulation acceptable to both sides is continuing, however, and now seems to have good prospects for success.

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[The broader armed forces alert which both sides have been maintaining has not been relaxed, however, nor are there as yet any signs that the strong concentrations of troops along both sides of the Punjab border are being dispersed. In fact both sides have deployed some additional troops to the Punjab area in the past few days.]

Although incidents leading to wider conflict could occur, Indian Prime Minister Shastri's departure today for a seven-day state visit to the USSR and Ayub Khan's plans to vacation in the remote northern part of Pakistan suggest that neither leader expects much of consequence to occur in their relations during the next week or so.

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NOTES

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Dahomey: [Chief of Staff Soglo says that the Dahomean Army now plans to bring about a change of government within the next two weeks. He has told the US ambassador that the occasion for the army's intervention will be disorders which are expected in connection with labor demonstrations on 23 May, and that figurehead President Apithy has been agreed upon to lead a new regime. The US Embassy is practically convinced that the French are managing the affair. They apparently believe that Apithy can be controlled but this seems problematical in the light of his record in recent years of favoring ties with Communist countries.]

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\*Sudan: The generally moderate Umma Party and its supporters have apparently won a clear-cut victory in the Sudanese parliamentary elections. Leftist groups have thus far won only a handful of seats, although they will probably improve their position when results are announced in a few days for the fifteen contests reserved for university graduates. An Umma-dominated government will probably be able to keep the leftists under control for the moment, but Umma leaders will still be faced with the task of overcoming the conflicts among the non-Communists which have broken up Sudanese coalitions in the past.

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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